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Western governments, media outlets and not a small number of academians seized 
upon the idea of “democratic revolution” to explain the March 2005 ousting of the 
government in Kyrgyzstan.  More detailed analyses illustrate the oversights of this 
account, particularly the role of patronage relations, in providing the means of 
mobilization. (1)  However, this in itself should not lead analysts to deny the role played 
by the manner in which the revolution has been portrayed.  Rather, one must investigate 
how the Tulip Revolution has been variously interpreted - locally and internationally, 
radically and conservatively. Together, these multiple explanations challenge the notion 
of a singular cause of the uprising and the prescience of those who claim to have 
predicted it.  Moreover, as portrayals of events, they are not merely retrospectives, but 
actually reconstruct the wider political scene.  Kyrgyzstan after the revolution departs 
from ideal-type models not just in its concrete factional patterns of politics and 
exchange, but in elite and popular political imaginations of what the future might hold.  
Its political development continues on a post-Soviet—at times neo-Soviet—trajectory, 
albeit one that offers hope for openness and reconstruction in some limited areas.  This 
essay charts three representations of the Tulip Revolution and their attending 
repercussions: revolution as a threat to Central Asia and the wider region; a revolution 
of elites; and revolution as disorder.      
A Very Unrevolutionary Revolution
Parliamentary elections in 2005 constituted the catalyst that ultimately brought down the 
regime of President Akaev. Although of a similar representational standard as previous 
elections, this vote was the first in Kyrgyzstan’s history that triggered significant 
1
mobilization against the regime. The elections were characterized by considerable, 
systematic interference by state authorities to support their allies; the prevalence of 
business owners with links to organized crime; widespread corruption and vote-buying; 
and the intimidation and marshalling of particular categories of voters, such as students 
and employees of state enterprises. (2)  Elite fear of “democratic revolution” produced a 
government response that relied heavily on propaganda (even in Akaev’s own 
speeches), involved blackmailing of opposition candidates, used the courts to block 
candidatures, and interfered in various other ways. Demonstrators raised other 
grievances - of poverty and inequality, corruption and nepotism, arbitrary and unjust 
courts, the persecution of opposition leaders, and the “family rule” of President Akaev.  
Protests initially enjoyed the support of specific patrons, but later these factions merged 
into a national movement, albeit one that was highly contingent upon the common goal 
of challenging or unseating the government.  This goal was realized after Akaev fled on 
24 March 2005.  The opposition was led by several well-known individuals, most of 
whom had been part of the outgoing regime, including Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was 
Prime Minister before being forced to resign in 2003 and went on to become President 
in July 2005, and Felix Kulov, who was Akaev’s Vice-President before being jailed by 
him in 1999. 
            
This summary, on the surface, gives considerable grounds for linking the “Tulip 
Revolution” to  other cases of “democratic revolution.”  Indeed, certain international 
organizations have sought to take credit for the revolution by attributing a major role to 
“civil society” organizations, in which they have played  a part. (3)  Such accounts, to a 
greater or lesser extent, produce an international discourse of “democratic revolution” 
that has emerged to explain the “orange” and “rose” revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, 
where the “revolutionary” leaderships had some financial and political links to the West.  
The repetition of this emphasis on the democratic basis of revolutionary change in the 
post-Soviet arena has been used to advocate US support for democracy promotion via 
regime change through popular protest. (4)  Civil society organizations reciprocate this 
rhetoric and seem to confirm the presuppositions of international donors that there is a 
powerful civil society movement in Kyrgyzstan. Groups such as Edil Baisalov’s Coalition 
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for Democracy and Civil Society and youth movements such as Birge and Kelkel 
became symbols of the revolution in Western accounts.  Yet while charismatic 
individuals, in particular Baisalov, have grown in stature since March 2005, the wider 
organizations that they represent remain on the margins of the new opposition 
movement, “For Reforms!” (Za Reformy!), which is dominated by wealthy businessmen 
and their allies.  A discourse of “democratic revolution” masks and sustains a largely 
marginalized NGO sector and raises the profile of certain individuals, but has had little 
or no structural impact on Kyrgyz politics.    
            
“Revolution” as a foreign threat: Kyrgyzstan’s difficult relations with the West
Post-Soviet discussions of “revolution” contrast with the positive “international” or 
Western representation.  Russian language conversations among members of the post-
Soviet elite regarding democratic or “multi-colored” revolution (raznotsvetnaya 
revolutsiya) across the former Soviet Union present the events in Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Kyrgyzstan as part of a foreign-backed coup: an outside and illegitimate threat to the 
established “authority” (avtoritet) and “stability” (stabil’nost’). (5)  This emphasis on 
stability and authority is clear in Central Asian elite responses to the revolution.  For 
example, Kazakhstan’s Kazakhstanskaya Pravda noted, “instead of ‘velvet’ and the 
aroma of roses and citrus in the air, there is the smell of smoke, blood and chaos.” (6)  
Such understandings were echoed in the remarks of Serik Primbetov, Deputy General 
Secretary of the Eurasian Economic Community, to a conference in Bishkek several 
months after the revolution. “Revolutions like in Kyrgyzstan challenge our ability to act 
together [in the Central Asian region] and create instability,” he noted.  “If such poor kids 
are sitting in the President’s chair what must that do for the economy.” (7)  It is easy to 
dismiss these accounts as self-serving justifications, but it must be acknowledged that 
they also illustrate the limits of the political elite in those parts of the former Soviet Union 
where the primary source of “international community” is found.  Popular opinion tends 
to mirror this elite understanding of international community.  A November 2006 opinion 
poll by the International Republican Institute in Bishkek found that 91% of Kyrgyz 
citizens believe that Kyrgyzstan should prioritize Russia in its foreign relations 
compared to 2% who favor the US. (8)
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This post-Soviet vision of international community also has led to increasing hostility to 
“the West” by the new government. It is hardly surprising that both the Bakiev-Kulov 
regime and the majority of the “For Reforms” movement favor increased ties with 
Moscow and a visible movement away from partnership with the United States. Since 
the revolution, Kyrgyz policy towards the US military base has been rent-seeking and 
inconsistent, especially since the 5 July 2005 declaration by the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization that the Kyrgyz position should be reviewed. (9)  Bakiev voiced his support 
for the SCO declaration on 11 July. After parliamentary and presidential elections had 
taken place in Afghanistan, the new President stated, “Now we can begin reviewing the 
issue of the advisability of the US military presence [in Kyrgyzstan].” (10)  It required an 
urgent visit by Donald Rumsfeld and an October 2005 visit by Condoleeza Rice to keep 
the pressure up on Kyrgyzstan, which eventually allowed the continuance of the base.  
By 2006, extended negotiations had allowed for a significant increase in US aid 
provided to Kyrgyzstan under the agreement (although not the extortionate cash 
transfer of 207 million dollars per year for the base that Bakiev had requested).  
However, pressure on the American base and mission in Kyrgyzstan remains, as 
illustrated by the expulsion of two US diplomats from Kyrgyzstan in July 2006. (11)  The 
Bakiev government continues to reassure Russia and neighboring Central Asian states 
of its hostility to “outside” powers, the impermanence of the US base and its 
commitment to the region. (12) 
“Revolution” of elites: bargaining the new constitutions 
The emphasis on “stability” and “authority” found in Akaev regime statements and anti-
revolution propaganda, (13) common across the region, (14) has been maintained and 
perhaps even strengthened under Bakiev and continues to suggest that politics is a 
domain where elites should control society.   Widespread protests in 2005 and 2006 
were understood popularly and in government as having been organized and paid for by  
local patrons.  This partially accurate caricature denies the genuine and potentially 
universal grievances that may have served as the primary source of popular hostility to 
the regime, and ignores the few radical movements being trumpeted by Western 
donors.  Thus, such an account denies even the nascence of a broad-based political 
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movement. Amongst the majority of elites who hold to such a political view, mass 
participation is perceived as a threat and negotiation is considered to be something that 
properly should take place behind closed doors, before a fait accompli is presented for 
public consumption.
            
Throughout 2006 the opposition “For Reforms!” movement used popular protests to 
pressure the Bakiev-Kulov regime into compromises that would disseminate power 
more widely and allow the regime’s opponents greater access to state resources.  
Whilst these protests illustrated popular grievances against the new elite, the “For 
Reforms!” leaders worked behind closed doors to fight for their particular interests. (15)  
This culminated in the adoption by parliament of two new constitutions in as many 
months (November and December 2006).  A 9 November version of amendments 
stripped the President of some of his powers and potentially allowed for a much 
stronger role for parties in parliament.  On 30 December, following the resignation of the 
government, a new set of amendments returned some of these presidential powers, 
including the right to appoint a cabinet without parliamentary approval. (16)  A number of 
opposition leaders voted for the second constitution, as well as for the first. (17)  These 
reversals of position are inexplicable unless one acknowledges that the majority of 
deputies in parliament, both “pro-government” and “opposition,” represent personal and 
familial interests and that it is difficult for them to imagine a different way of doing 
politics.     
    
“Revolution” as disorder: popular apathy towards politics
Western donors to Kyrgyzstan tried to create popular debate on the new constitution 
throughout 2006 with the promise of a referendum on the constitutional commission’s 
proposals by the end of the year.  This vote failed to materialize, with the amendments 
being negotiated solely between government and opposition, as mentioned above.  Not 
only do elite discourses work within their own group to limit political thinking, they also 
serve to discourage alternative liberal or radical thinking among the population.  Among 
the urban, especially ethnic minority populations in Bishkek, (18) “multicolored 
revolution” came to mean chaos, looting, and marauding during the revolution itself and 
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the months following it.  This popular perception openly shuns the political and focuses 
on the revolution’s impact on personal and family livelihoods.  This viewpoint was 
expressed to me by numerous colleagues and friends in Bishkek following the Tulip 
Revolution.  For example, one lower-middle class Russian friend expressed his 
insecurity in these terms in a personal conversation of 9 April 2005:   “Only God knows 
what’s going to happen tomorrow,” he exclaimed.  “When Akaev was President we all 
knew that the level of the dollar would be 42, 43 [Kyrgyz soms] but now, no one knows 
what will be tomorrow.”  Such testimonies are consistent with recent social surveys, 
which show the continued dominance of a post-communist perspective on politics, 
coupled with considerable skepticism towards elites. (19)
The power of representation, the narrative used within society to explain and 
understand events such as the revolution, also helps explain the confused and 
inconsistent patterns emerging in contemporary Kyrgyz politics.  It highlights how post-
revolutionary actions are not just materially motivated, but socially constructed. Post-
revolutionary Kyrgyzstan has been marked by elite attempts to close off political 
openings and assure regional governments and Russia of the priority of “stability;” 
marginal radical protests against the new government; and popular discontent towards 
politics alongside a willingness to operate outside the law in order to claim land or 
protect oneself.   Such developments indicate that the repercussions of Kyrgyzstan’s 
Tulip Revolution are complex and still emerging.  Moreover, the story is not all bad.  In 
particular, despite the sectional interests driving negotiations, the practice of truck and 
barter between factions, which are more evenly balanced than during the Akaev era, 
might be considered a positive development and consistent with the pact-driven early 
stages identified by some democratization theorists.  This provides a glimmer of hope in 
a country where the ruling elite’s power is limited by a burgeoning opposition. In this 
sense, Kyrgyzstan remains an exception in Central Asia. 
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